
Death of Yugoslavia
DISCUSSION ON THE YEAR 1968, SELF-MANAGEMENT, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA


Transcript of the Conversation for Reading, Reflection, and Further Analysis
Note: The document consolidates the conversation from this correspondence, beginning with a question about Borjan and the student demonstrations of 1968. For clarity, the user’s remarks and the assistant’s responses are clearly marked. Original web citations from the conversation display are carried over as references in square brackets; they should be viewed as source markers from the chat, not as standalone bibliographic data.
USER
What happened to one of the organizers of the student demonstrations in Yugoslavia in 1968? His illegal code name was Borjan, I don’t know his real name.
ASSISTANT
I found the man you are referring to. This is Božidar Borjan, one of the participants and activists in the student movement in Belgrade in 1968. However, I have not found reliable data that “Borjan” was his illegal code name—in contemporary documents, it appears as his actual name. [Sources cited in the conversation: turn737907search24, turn737907search7]
What happened to Božidar Borjan? In 1968, he was a student at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade and participated in the student movement. During the demonstrations, he addressed the assembled students together with Vlada Mijanović and other representatives of the movement. [turn737907search3, turn737907search4]
In 1970, he faced disciplinary bodies for editing the student magazine Krug. The magazine brought together students and professors of various philosophical and political orientations.
He was sentenced to two months in prison. The official justification related to formal omissions regarding the publication of the magazine, while historical accounts place this case in the broader context of political pressure on student dissidents.
Later he went abroad. A source I found states that after some time he left Yugoslavia. I was unable to reliably determine where he went, what he did there, or when he died, if he has passed away. [turn737907search24, turn737907search7]
But there is one important ambiguity If you remember that Borjan was an underground name, it is possible that you are thinking of another person, or that there was a confusion between a name and a nickname.
Therefore, I would ask you just one thing: do you remember whether that man was from Belgrade and whether he went abroad after the demonstrations, or did he continue his political work in Yugoslavia?
That information would help me distinguish Božidar Borjan from other activists from 1968 and try to determine his further fate.
USER
I thought that was his illegal code name, but judging by your findings, it was his real name. I went to secret meetings in those years, so I remember him; I thought it was his nickname, but it turns out it was his real first and last name.
ASSISTANT
Then it is possible that we have indeed arrived at the man you remember from that time. It is interesting that you attended secret meetings and that the name Borjan remained in your memory after so many decades.
There is a difference between what a person personally remembers and what we can confirm with documents today. Your memory is an important clue, but I would not prematurely rule out the possibility that Božidar Borjan used another name in a tighter circle of like-minded political peers.
Now I checked another important historical source and found information that complements the previous answer.
According to an international report on the student movement from 1970, Božidar Borjan was transferred to the hospital of the prison in Zrenjanin during his two-month prison sentence due to poor health. [turn201369search6]
This is a concrete clue about his fate, but it does not yet answer the question of what happened to him in later decades. I have not found enough reliable data to claim that he emigrated or where he lived later.
I would also like to clarify something from your personal memory: did you meet him at meetings in Belgrade or somewhere else in Vojvodina? I am not asking out of mere curiosity, but because the meeting place could help determine which group he belonged to and whether he used a pseudonym.
USER
I studied in Belgrade back then and met him at meetings that were secret and the location always changed, most often in taverns around Belgrade, working in smaller groups.
ASSISTANT
What you describe fits into the working methods of small political and student groups of that time. Changing meeting locations and gathering in smaller circles were ways to limit the exposure of participants to surveillance.
That is precisely why your testimony is interesting: public historical sources mostly record speakers, arrests, trials, and published texts, while much less is known about the daily work of informal groups.
In the sources I have now found, it is confirmed that Božidar Borjan was part of the Belgrade student circle and that in 1970 he was sentenced to 60 days in prison for duplicating the magazine Krug. [turn250679search3, turn250679search5]
I would like to ask you something else, if you remember: at those meetings, did you talk about the reform of Yugoslav socialism and self-management, or were you already considering the creation of an entirely new political organization?
That would help us better understand the circle to which you belonged, without speculating about people whose identities and fates we have not yet managed to establish.
USER
We talked and worked on reforming the then-predatory system, the so-called red bourgeoisie, and not against the system; rather, the recovery of the Communist Party was the priority.
ASSISTANT
Now it is much clearer to me what you mean. And what you describe has important confirmation in historical sources.
In an academic study on the 1968 student movement, it is noted that the demonstrators in Belgrade criticized inequality, the privileges of the bureaucracy, and the divergence of Yugoslav society from proclaimed socialist principles. The movement was not simply anti-communist; a significant portion of the participants sought a more consistent realization of socialism, not its abolition. [turn441529search1, turn441529search5]
That is the essence of the slogan “Down with the red bourgeoisie!”. The criticism was directed not only at individuals who grew rich or acquired privileges, but also at a system in which political power and social status could be detached from responsibility to the workers.
Your formulation about the “recovery of the Communist Party” adds another important dimension: you are talking about an organized attempt to initiate changes from within, among people who believed that the party was betraying its own ideals.
Still, one should not assume that all participants in the secret meetings held identical views. The student movement encompassed various currents, from reformist to revolutionary.
I would like to continue from there, as your personal memory can supplement what is found in books.
At those meetings, did you consider a concrete program for changing the leadership and democratizing the Party, or were you primarily studying Marx, Lenin, and Yugoslav self-management, trying to find theoretical justification for changes?
I am not asking to fit your views at the time into a pre-packaged historical narrative, but to understand what really happened in the circle to which you belonged.
USER
We went to Communist Party meetings across faculties and exposed the phonies in the ranks of the Communist Party, and Borjan was one of the speakers—he would interrupt the agenda and criticize the leaders’ behavior; he was well anchored in philosophy and the program of the LCY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia).
ASSISTANT
Now you have described something that fits very well into the documented history of the student movement, especially the actions of students at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade after June 1968.
It is particularly significant that you mention going to party organization meetings across faculties and criticizing their leaders from the perspective of the program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia itself. That is not the same as opposing socialism: it was a criticism of the gap between officially proclaimed principles and the actual behavior of people holding political power.
I also found a historical record directly referring to Borjan. In an international overview of student struggles from 1970, he is listed as philosophy student Boža Borjan, along with Vlada Mijanović and other activists. The record also describes repressive measures against students and their insistence that the demands from June 1968 had not been met. [turn849628search0, turn849628search3]
There is another interesting detail. In a preserved text from the student newspaper Student from June 1968, it can be seen that the students justified their demands precisely by the need to consistently implement self-management and democratize society. [turn849628search4, turn849628search5]
Your testimony adds what newspaper articles often do not record: how that criticism was conveyed directly into party organizations through debates with leaders.
The most important question that remains open is Borjan’s later fate. For now, I can confirm his activity and penalty from 1970, but not reliably what he did after that.
If you wish, I will continue to investigate that exact lead—where he went after the student conflicts with the party leadership, whether he remained in Yugoslavia, and whether there are later records or testimonies about him. I would not want to invent a biography for a man you personally knew.
USER
I thought that after the collapse of the student revolt near the underpass in New Belgrade he “sold out” to the state, because there were rumors that some of the leaders were bought… back then I lived in Student City and was in the inner circle of the protest organizers, but at that exact moment I was at home and followed everything on the radio.
ASSISTANT
Now I understand. You were in Student City, you knew people from the inner circle of organizers, and when the decisive events occurred near the underpass in New Belgrade, you were at home following events over the radio. That is why you experienced some events directly, and others through information circulating among students at the time.
Your suspicion that Borjan might have “sold out” to the state is understandable in the context of the conflicts of that time, but it is important to separate rumors from evidence.
In the available historical sources, I found no evidence that Božidar Borjan collaborated with state security or that he was bribed. On the contrary, it is documented that in 1970 he was sentenced to a prison term for publishing the student magazine Krug. One historical review cites a sentence of 60 days in prison, while another confirms that he was imprisoned and transferred to the prison hospital in Zrenjanin due to health problems. [turn928209search21, turn928209search2, turn928209search3]
That, of course, does not in itself prove what his relations with the authorities were in other periods. Nor would it be justified to declare him a state collaborator based on rumors, or to claim that such a possibility is definitively excluded.
I would like to clarify one more thing, as it could be crucial for research.
When did you first hear that Borjan allegedly “sold out”—immediately after the 1968 demonstrations, or only later, when the arrests and trials of student activists began in 1970?
That timing difference is important. Perhaps the rumor referred to his conduct during the demonstrations themselves, or perhaps to something that happened later. I do not want to lead you to a specific conclusion; I am trying to separate what you personally saw from what was being said at the time.
USER
I didn’t hear that Borjan sold out, but that some of the leaders were used, which of course could be true, just as many have now sold out to Vučić and tomorrow to someone else, so-called turncoats. Looking from today’s perspective, it seems to me that it was the beginning of the ruin of the LCY, various figures turned coat and got away using tricks rather than through the merit of honest work and reputation among the working class, and using membership they looted and grew rich, only to definitely break such a socialist Yugoslavia into small states and now support capitalism for personal enrichment.
ASSISTANT
I think you have opened a very important question: was the year 1968 merely a missed opportunity to reform Yugoslavia, or was it also one of the moments when the space for a genuine reform of the socialist system from within began to close?
Your interpretation has historical ground, although I would separate several processes.
1. The year 1968 — the moment when the system refused a serious self-confrontation Historian Aleksandar Pavlović and philosopher Mark Losoncz, in a paper on the legacy of the Belgrade demonstrations, describe the dissatisfaction that had accumulated over years due to social inequalities, bureaucratization, and unemployment. Students demanded freedom of speech, the abolition of privileges, and more real self-management. [turn263105search4, turn263105search2]
What you yourself emphasized is important: many students did not want the abolition of socialism, but its more consistent implementation.
That is precisely where the paradox arises. The party leadership could publicly accept part of the criticism without allowing the critical movement to become a permanent, independent force monitoring power.
2. How can reforms be suppressed without formally abolishing the system? There are several mechanisms that correspond to the problem you describe:
- Co-optation: critics are integrated into existing structures and lose part of their independence.
- Advancement through hierarchy: positions are obtained thanks to political suitability and connections, rather than necessarily expertise or the trust of workers.
- Suppression of critics: those who insist on accountability can be removed from organizations or public life.
- Separation of formal and actual authority: workers have self-management rights on paper, but key decisions can remain in the hands of party and managerial structures.
These mechanisms do not prove that every official was corrupt or that all student leaders were co-opted. However, historical research confirms that repressive actions followed 1968 against part of the student activists and critical professors. [turn263105search0, turn263105search10]
3. Was 1968 the beginning of the downfall of the LCY? Here I would make a distinction.
It is not accurate to claim that the LCY began to decline only in 1968. Contradictions existed earlier: the 1965 economic reform, unemployment, workers leaving for abroad, differences in development among republics, and conflicts over how much market mechanism versus political control should exist in the self-management system.
But 1968 can be viewed as the moment when it became obvious that the party struggled to accept independent criticism, even when coming from people appealing to its own ideals. Nick Miller’s research on Yugoslavia in 1968 describes that period as a turning point between different possible paths of development for Yugoslav socialism. [turn263105search7, turn263105search11]
Later came new problems: economic indebtedness, constitutional and inter-republican tensions, the rise of nationalism, and the crisis of federal leadership after Tito’s death. The dissolution of Yugoslavia cannot be explained by a single event, but it is justified to examine whether the failure of reforms contributed to the weakening of the system’s ability to change peacefully.
4. What about “turncoats” and the transition from socialism to capitalism? Here your remark is particularly interesting. People who once advanced in the party system could retain political connections, organizational skills, and access to resources, and then use them under new political and economic circumstances.
Still, to determine who actually profited from the change of system, one would need to track specific biographies: former functions, privatization decisions, ownership shares, political connections, and subsequent business interests. The mere fact that someone changed political sides is not proof that they enriched themselves illegally.
For me, the most important question arising from your testimony is the following: if the people who criticized bureaucracy in 1968 were suppressed, co-opted, or marginalized, who was left to control those who managed social property?
This is a question about institutions and accountability, not just the character of individuals. And it connects your experience from Student City with the later fate of Yugoslav self-management.
USER
An important moment in the breakup of Yugoslavia was the fragmenting of the LCY into LEAGUES—the League of Communists of Yugoslavia—and admitting people into the party based on a quota key, like needing three women, eight Hungarians, a couple of Slovaks, ten Serbs, fifty Yugoslavs; people joined not based on merit and honesty, but by quota key, and that’s how thieves, frauds, and hustlers infiltrated the state leadership, making it relatively easy to organize the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia. That is what I think.
ASSISTANT
I think your thesis is worthy of serious historical discussion. Especially because you are not talking only about nationalism or conflicts between republics, but about the way leadership was selected, how political power was acquired, and whom that power served.
I checked historical works and found an important fact that partially supports your thinking, but also requires clarification.
1. The LCY indeed gradually transformed into a league of republican party organizations At the Ninth Congress of the LCY in 1969, the autonomy of republican and provincial organizations was further strengthened. They gained greater control over the selection and assignment of party cadres. At the same time, republican leaderships increasingly became independent centers of political power. [turn476105search0, turn476105search25]
This is an important difference: it was not just the name or organizational form that changed. The relationship between the federal center and the republican leaderships was changing.
Your observation that this opened space for advancement through political connections rather than through work and ability represents a serious hypothesis. However, decentralization itself does not prove that negative selection prevailed everywhere.
2. The national quota key: justified representation or distribution of positions? Here I would separate two things.
- The representation of nations and nationalities was meant to prevent the dominance of a single ethnic group and ensure equality.
- The allocation of functions according to predetermined quotas, if it suppresses expertise, accountability, and the trust of workers, can turn equality into bureaucratic bargaining over positions.
In other words, the problem is not that Hungarians, Slovaks, Serbs, or members of other nations were represented in the leadership. The problem arises if national affiliation becomes a substitute for ability, honesty, and responsibility.
Historical research confirms that national representation and decentralization became increasingly important in the Yugoslav political system. [turn476105search6, turn476105search28]
3. How could this have contributed to the dissolution of Yugoslavia? In my opinion, your thesis becomes particularly interesting when connecting three processes:
- The weakening of the joint party center and the strengthening of republican party apparatuses.
- The absence of sufficiently effective oversight of executives, allowing political connections to become more important than accountability to citizens and workers.
- The transformation of republican leaderships into centers of their own interests, which made reaching a common solution difficult when the crisis arrived.
Historiographical works on Yugoslavia indicate that the decentralization of the party system contributed to the creation of relatively autonomous republican centers of power. After Tito’s death, these centers became key actors in mutual conflicts. [turn476105search0, turn476105search12]
Nevertheless, the breakup of the state had other causes as well: economic crisis, debts, nationalist mobilization, constitutional disputes, and political decisions made by leaderships in the late eighties and early nineties.
4. Your most important point is perhaps actually slightly different From what you say about 1968 and your experiences at meetings, it seems to me that the core of your thesis is as follows:
Yugoslavia did not collapse solely because it failed to reconcile the interests of its nations and republics, but also because it did not build sufficiently effective mechanisms by which workers and citizens could control the people managing the party, social property, and the state.
This is a question that can be investigated through concrete data, not just political evaluations.
That is why I would suggest that the next step be a comparison of two things: how party officials were selected, and how workers could actually dismiss a manager or executive who abused their position. If a large gap existed between formal rights and actual power, that is precisely where we might find one of the key mechanisms of the decline of the self-management system.


